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Abstract:
How does the complexity of the world around us affect the reliability of our opinions? Moti-
vated by this question, we quantitatively study an opinion formation mechanism whereby an
uninformed observer gradually forms opinions about a world composed of subjects interre-
lated by a signed network of mutual trust and distrust. We show numerically and analytically
that the observer’s resulting opinions are highly inconsistent (they tend to be independent of
the observer’s initial opinions) and unstable (they exhibit wide stochastic variations). Opin-
ion inconsistency and instability increase with the world’s complexity, intended as the num-
ber of subjects and their interactions. This increase can be prevented by suitably expanding
the observer’s initial amount of information. Our findings imply that even an individual
who initially trusts a small number of credible information sources may end up trusting the
deceptive ones if some trust relations exist between the credible and deceptive sources.
Introduction
Identifying potential mechanisms behind the formation of opinions in society is vital to understand
how polarization emerges in society1, how misinformation spreads and can be prevented2, and
how science can be effectively communicated to the public3. Despite recent advances in how opin-
ions propagate in social networks1, how artificial agents promote low-credibility content in social
media4, 5 and how rapidly misinformation spreads compared to reliable content2, 6, misinformation
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still thrives in our society. This is well-exemplified by the recent growth of anti-vaccination views
and the related existence of antivaccination clusters in online social networks7. The popularity of
unreliable opinions – which is especially dangerous during global emergencies, such as the recent
COVID-19 pandemic8 – calls for a deeper investigation of the possible drivers behind the process
whereby individuals form opinions in a society.
Models of opinion formation in social systems have been studied in statistical physics9–11,
sociology12–16, and game theory17. They focus on opinion propagation on a social network of
influence and allow us to model phenomena such as the emergence of consensus in the popula-
tion, for example. Most existing models, however, neglect the potential interconnectedness among
topics, which is instead a key aspect of modern social and information environments18, 19. These
models view opinions of an individual on different topics as results of independent realizations of
an opinion formation processes, and they neglect direct connections among opinions on distinct
topics.
Departing from existing models, we consider a situation where an individual observer forms
opinions about a set of subjects interrelated by positive and negative links. The subjects on which
the opinions are formed can represent governments, politicians, news media, or other individuals.
Connections between subjects can take various forms20. One credible news source can for example
tend to report in agreement with another credible source (a positive link) whereas a misinformation
source can tend to disagree with both credible information sources (negative links). Such systems
with signed relations are described by Heider’s social balance theory21–23 as documented using
data on armed conflicts among countries24, 25 and large-scale social media26–28, for example. Of
particular interest is the tendency for the subjects to form two opposing camps24, 29, 30, although
these macroscopic structures are generally imperfect. Two countries, for example, can belong to
the same alliance whose members generally have positive relations, yet their mutual relation can be
negative due to historic or economic reasons. In science, there are multiple Nobel prize recipients
who endorsed unscientific theories31.
We study how an observer equipped with prior information about some subjects can use
noisy signed relations between subjects divided into two camps to form opinions on the remaining
subjects. Forming a reliable opinion in a complex situation requires effortful reasoning. How-
ever, psychological research indicates that humans tend to be rather driven by simple heuristics
when forming opinions about complex topics, sometimes reaching opinions that violate basic logic
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rules32, 33. The limitations of our cognition have important consequences. For example, the sus-
ceptibility to partisan fake news was recently found to be driven more by “lazy reasoning” than
by partisan bias34. For this reason, we focus here on local rules (heuristics) of opinion formation
using a signed network of relations.
We find that even a small fraction of misleading links in the relation network among the
subjects (e.g., a link of mutual trust between a scientific and low-credibility information source)
leads to the resulting opinions that are both inconsistent with the observer’s seed opinions and vary
significantly between model realizations. We determine analytically the relation between aver-
age opinion consistency and the world complexity, represented by the number of subjects, which
demonstrates that opinion inconsistency grows as the world complexity increases. This increase
can be prevented by suitably increasing the observer’s initial number of independent opinions.
Although opinion consistency depends on network topology and can be improved by consider-
ing a more sophisticated local opinion formation mechanism, our main conclusions are robust to
variations of the network topology and the opinion-formation mechanism.
Our findings point that even in the absence of social influence, opinion formation in a world
composed of many interrelated subjects is inherently fragile. Since subjects may represent co-
existing scientific or low-credibility information sources, our model presents a contributing mecha-
nism for how misinformation sources may gain their audience. Our work paves the way to studying
strategies to increase the reliability of opinion formation.
Results
Opinion formation model. We consider an individual observer who gradually develops opinions
on a world composed of N interrelated subjects (Fig. 1A). The number of subjects represents the
complexity of the world. Each opinion is for simplicity assumed to take one of three possible states:
No opinion, a positive opinion (trust), or a negative opinion (distrust). The observer’s opinions can
be formally represented by an N -dimensional opinion vector o whose element oi represents the
opinion on subject i; oi ∈ {−1, 0, 1} corresponds to a negative opinion, no opinion, and a positive
opinion, respectively. The subjects form a signed undirected network of relations. These relations
are represented by a symmetric N ×N relation matrix whose element Rij represents the trust rela-
tion between subjects i and j; Rij ∈ {−1, 0, 1} corresponds to a negative relation, no relation, and
a positive relation, respectively. We emphasize the main difference between this setting and tradi-
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tional opinion formation models based on propagation on networks of social influence9, 10, 13, 14: In
existing models, simulating the opinion formation on N subjects would require running N inde-
pendent realizations of the opinion formation process, which would miss the interconnectedness
among subjects; by contrast, in the proposed approach, the interconnectedness among subjects is
naturally encoded in the relation matrix R.
The observer’s opinion formation starts from an initial condition where the observer has an
initial opinion on a “seed” subset of subjects, S (seed opinions). The observer then gradually forms
an opinion on each of the remaining subjects via sequential opinion formation, until opinions on all
subjects are formed. Once formed, the opinions are not updated (we relax this assumption later). In
one step, a target subject i is chosen at random from the pool of subjects with no opinion (oi = 0).
The observer then attempts to form an opinion on i. From all subjects j with an opinion (oj 6= 0)
that are adjacent to i (Rij 6= 0), we choose source subject k at random. The opinion oi is then
set to okRki (see Fig. 1B). As a result, a positive opinion on i is formed if either: (1) the observer
has a positive opinion on k and the relation between k and i is positive (“the friends of my friends
are also my friends”) or (2) the observer has a negative opinion on k and the relation between k
and i is negative (formalizing the ancient proverb “the enemies of my enemies are my friends”).
A negative opinion on i is formed otherwise. Note that this mechanism produces a balanced triad
consisting of the observer and subjects i and k (in Heider’s original sense of heterogeneous triads
that can include both individuals as well as objects21, 35). The observer then continues with a next
subject until opinions on all subjects have been formed. This opinion formation process—which
we refer to as the random neighbor rule as it forms opinions using neighboring subjects chosen at
random—is purposely simple as it intends to imitate an observer with limited cognitive resources
(see34 for a recent account on susceptibility to fake news driven by “lack of reasoning”). We study
a more thorough process (majority rule) below.
The opinion formation outcome is not deterministic (except for the special case when all
paths in the subject network are balanced; see Sec. S1 in the Supplementary Information, SI) as
it is influenced by: (1) the order in which subjects are chosen as targets and (2) the choice of
the source subject for each target subject. For a given relation network and a set of seed opin-
ions, various resulting opinions are thus possible. Individual realizations of the opinion formation
process correspond to a population of independent individuals or, alternatively, various possible
“fates” of a single individual. To characterize statistical properties of the resulting opinions, we
study outcomes of multiple model realizations. For simulations on synthetic relation networks, we
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additionally average over various network realizations to remove possible effects of a particular
network realization on the results.
Opinion formation simulations on synthetic networks. We now study the opinion formation
model on a specific relation network where the subjects form two camps. This scenario is relevant
to various real situations24, 29, 30: The two camps can represent two opposing political parties (such
as democrats and republicans), standard news outlets and false news outlets, or scientists and
conspiracy theorists, for example. In synthetic networks, each camp consists of N/2 subjects.
Every subject is connected by signed links with z random subjects, thus creating a regular random
network of trust with node degree z. If subjects from the same camp are linked, the sign of their
relation is +1 with probability 1−β and −1 otherwise. Similarly, if subjects from different camps
are linked, the sign of their relation is −1 with probability 1 − β and +1 otherwise. Parameter
β ∈ [0, 0.5] thus plays the role of structural noise. As β grows, the negative relations become more
common within each camp and positive relations become more common across the camps. When
β = 0.5, the two camps become indistinguishable by definition. The network’s level of structural
balance22, 36 is the ratio of the number of balanced triads to all triads in the network. In our case,
B = (1− β)3 + 3(1− β)β2, (1)
which corresponds to either all links of a triad (the first term) or one link of a triad (the second term)
respecting the two-camp structure, producing a balanced triad as a result. B grows monotonously
with β. The equation can be inverted, yielding β = (1 + 3
√
1− 2B)/2, which can be used to write
our results in terms of B instead of β.
We assume that the observer has initially a positive opinion on NS seed subjects from camp 1,
and we examine whether the observer ends up with a positive opinion on other subjects from camp
1 and a negative opinion on subjects from camp 2, or not. If the two camps represent scientists and
conspiracy theorists, for example, the corresponding practical question is whether an observer who
initially trusts a scientist would end up predominantly trusting scientists or conspiracy theorists.
Without noise (β = 0), the opinion formation leads to a definite outcome: A positive opinion on
all subjects from camp 1 and a negative opinion on all subjects from camp 2. In such a case, we
say that the opinions are perfectly consistent with the underlying two-camp structure of the relation









where S is the set of seed subjects and T is the vector representing the ground-truth structure of
the relation network (in our case, Tj = 1 for j from camp 1 and Tj = −1 for j from camp 2).
If the observer’s opinions are chosen at random, the resulting consistency is zero on average. A
zero or small consistency value thus indicates that the observer’s opinions are independent of the
seed opinion and thus inconsistent with the two-camp structure of the relation network. Negative
consistency is also possible: The observer starts with a positive opinion on subjects from camp 1
but ends with more positive opinions in camp 2 than in camp 1.
Knowing that opinion consistency is one in the absence of noise, how does it change as the
noise parameter β grows? Numerical simulations for a set of 100 subjects and one seed opinion
show (Fig. 2a) that opinion consistency decreases rapidly with β. Indeed, if the relationship be-
tween consistency and noise was linear, we would have expected C0(β) := 1− 2β which starts at
one when β = 0 and reaches zero when β = 0.5 as the two camps then cannot be distinguished
by definition. By contrast, we observe a substantially faster decay of the mean consistency µC(β).
In addition, the consistency values vary strongly between model realizations. For β = 0.02, for
example, mean consistency is only 0.80 and there are model realizations with consistency below
0.54 and above 0.97 (the 10th and 90th percentile, respectively, of the obtained consistency val-
ues for z = 4). This means that even when the noise is small, some sets of formed opinions are
in a dramatic disagreement with the observer’s seed opinion. To appreciate the level of noise in
real data, Moore24 reported that 80% of triads among middle East countries are balanced. Eq. (1)
shows that such a level of structural balance is achieved at β ≈ 0.08 in our two-camp networks.
In Fig. 2b, mean opinion consistency at β = 0.08 is as low as 0.42 (for z = 10). These results
confirm our initial hypothesis that a realistic level of noise leads to the adoption of a large fraction
of opinions that do not align with the observer’s initial opinion.
Master equation for opinion consistency and its solution. The opinion formation with the two-
camp structure can be studied analytically under the assumption of homogeneous mixing37. It is
advantageous to study the problem in terms of the number of formed opinions, n, and the number
of consistent opinions, c (that is, the opinions that are consistent with the seed opinions and the
two-camp structure). By rewriting the sum
∑
j 6=i ojTj in Eq. (2) as 2c−N+NS , we obtain opinion
consistency as C = (2c−N +NS)/(N −NS).
When the observer forms a new opinion, n increases by one and c either increases by one (if
the new opinion is consistent) or remains constant. We introduce the probability distribution of c
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when n opinions have been formed, P (c;n), for which the master equation (see Methods for the
derivation) has the form
P (c;n) = P (c− 1;n− 1) c(1− 2β) + β(n+ 1)− 1
n− 1 + P (c;n− 1)
[




The initial condition P (NS;NS) = 1 represents that all NS seed opinions are consistent. Eq. (3)
can be solved numerically and the obtained solution P (c;n) can be used to compute the corre-
sponding mean opinion consistency. The numerical solution agrees well with the model simula-
tions (Fig. 2b), in particular when the relation network is not sparse (z & 10).
Eq. (3) allows us to analytically study the dependence between opinion consistency and the
world complexity, represented by the number of subjects, N . A surprising finding is that as the
number of subjects increases, the distribution of C obtained by solving Eq. (3), P (C), does not
approach a well-defined limit distribution, but instead steadily shifts towards C = 0 and becomes
narrower in the process (Figure 2c). We study this behavior by computing the mean opinion con-
sistency, µC(N), and the standard deviation of consistency, σC(N) (see Sec. S2 in the SI for details
and additional analytical results).
Multiplying Eq. (3) with c and summing it over c = NS, . . . , N yields the recurrence equa-
tion
〈c(n)〉 = n− 2β
n− 1 〈c(n− 1)〉+ β (4)
with the initial condition 〈c(NS)〉 = NS (the seed opinions are assumed to be correct). This





Γ(N + 1− 2β)Γ(NS + 1)
Γ(NS + 1− 2β)Γ(N)
]
. (5)
For NS = 1, the corresponding mean consistency is
µC(N) =
[
Γ(N + 1− 2β)
Γ(2− 2β)Γ(N) − 1
]
/(N − 1) (6)
which simplifies to µC(N) = 1 when β = 0, as expected. The leading contribution of Eq. (6) is
µC(N) = N
−2β/Γ(2− 2β) +O(1/N). (7)
This shows that when β > 0, the mean opinion consistency vanishes in the limit N → ∞. The
leading-term contribution to σC(N) is also proportional to N
−2β when β ≤ 1/4. When β > 1/4,
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the leading term becomes proportional to N−1/2. These analytic results agree with numerical
simulations of the model (Figure 3a,b and Fig. S1 in the SI).
The behavior demonstrated by Figures 2b and 3, and supported by the analytic solution
above, has important consequences. It shows that as the world complexity increases, the formed
opinions become on average less consistent with the seed opinions and the two-camp structure of
the subject network. Crucially, the opinion consistency is zero in the limit of an infinite number
of subjects for any positive level of noise, β, in the subject relation network: In the limit of an
infinite-complexity world, even a tiny amount of noise is enough to nullify opinion consistency.
The convergence of opinion consistency to zero as N → ∞ can be avoided if the number
of seed opinions grows linearly with N so that the fraction of seed opinions remains constant.




in the limit N → ∞ and the standard deviation of consistency vanishes as 1/
√
N (see Sec. S2.2 in
the SI). This scaling relation determines the necessary proportion of seed opinions, fS , needed to
achieve a desired opinion consistency, µC , for given β. These results are confirmed by numerical
simulations shown in Fig. 3c,d and Fig. S2 in the SI. Despite having a positive limit value, opinion
consistency still decreases quickly with noise in the relation network when fS is small.
While our findings hold qualitatively when a different topology of the relation network is
used, the mean opinion consistency values are heavily affected by the network topology (see Fig-
ure 4). We run the opinion formation model on a growing preferential attachment network, a
configuration model (CN) network with a power-law degree distribution, and Watts-Strogatz net-
works with various values of the rewiring probability, pr (see Sec. S3 in the SI for details on the
network construction and additional simulation results). We find that networks with broad degree
distributions lead to higher opinion consistency which decays with N slower (see Figs. S3 and S4
in the SI) than in the previously studied random networks. By contrast, Watts-Strogatz networks
yield lower opinion consistency which further decreases as the networks become more regular
through lowering the rewiring probability, pr.
Opinion formation using the majority rule. The results described above hold for the opinion
formation model where a random neighbor of a target subject is chosen as the reference. We chose
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this model to study the consequences of a cognitively easy opinion formation model. At this stage,
one might object that the observed sensitivity of opinion consistency to noise might be because
each formed opinion directly relies on only one previously formed opinion, and it might disappear
if the observer incorporates the information from more neighbors before forming an opinion. To
rule out this potential argument, we investigate a model where all neighbors of a target subject are
considered before forming the opinion. Denote the numbers of neighbors leading to the adoption
of a positive and a negative opinion (determined as in Figure 1b) as nP and nN , respectively. If
nP > nN , the observer forms a positive opinion. If nN > nP , the observer forms a negative
opinion. If nP = nN , a random opinion is formed. We refer to this as the majority opinion
formation rule. It is more demanding than the original random neighbor rule based on choosing
a random neighbor as it assumes that the observer carefully collects all evidence for forming an
opinion on a target subject. The majority rule is nevertheless still a local rule as it only considers
direct neighbors of a target subject.
Using the majority rule, a scaling analogous to Figure 3 can be observed (Figure 5a,b) when
the number of seed opinions is fixed. The important difference is that the scaling exponent now
depends on both β and z whereas a higher mean degree, z, generally leads to µC(N) and σC(N)
decaying slower with N . Except for the smallest used noise and the highest used degree (β = 0.05
and z = 50), all slopes of linear fits between lnµC(N) and lnN are significantly positive. Since
the majority rule does not lend itself to analytical computation, whether the limit of µC(N) is
indeed positive when β is sufficiently small and z is sufficiently high remains an open question.
When the fraction of seed opinions, fS , is fixed, µC(N) converges to a positive value and σC(N)
vanishes as N grows (Fig. S5 in the SI). The scaling of the majority rule and the random neighbor
rule is thus qualitatively the same when fS is fixed. Figure 5c shows mean opinion consistency as
a function of structural noise for fixed fS when the number of subjects is large. We see that when
the network density is low (z = 4), the majority rule achieves results that are comparable with
those of the random neighbor rule. When z increases, the majority rule leads to significantly more
consistent opinions than the random neighbor rule. It has to be noted, though, that when z is large,
the cost for the observer to collect and analyze all information for opinion formation is large too.
The effect of opinion updating on opinion consistency. To focus on the opinion formation mech-
anism alone, the original model assumes that the formed opinions cannot be changed anymore. In
real life, however, we occasionally re-evaluate our positions. This re-evaluation can be included in
the model by allowing the opinions to be updated as it is, in fact, common in the opinion formation
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literature17, 38, 39.
To incorporate an updating mechanism while preserving the spirit of the model, we assume
that in the first phase, all opinions are formed using the original model. In the second phase, target
subjects for opinion updating are repeatedly chosen from all subjects at random. Opinions are
updated in the same way as they have been formed in the first phase, i.e., using the random neighbor
rule or the majority rule. Simulation results (see Fig. S6 in the SI) show that the effect of opinion
updating markedly differs between the two opinion formation rules. When the random neighbor
rule is used, opinion consistency substantially decreases with the number of updated opinions. The
reason for this decrease lies in the opinion formation rule which relies on one randomly chosen
neighbor of the target subject. Noise in the relation network thus continues to accumulate through
updating which thus lowers opinion consistency. By contrast, opinion consistency substantially
increases with the number of updated opinions when the majority rule is used. Thanks to its
thorough (albeit local) consideration of opinions on neighbors of the target subject, the majority
rule is capable of identifying and correcting imbalanced triads in the relation network, and thus
increase opinion consistency.
Opinion formation simulations on real networks. The trust consistency metric requires infor-
mation on the ground truth structure of the relation network (such as the assignment of subjects to
one of the two camps in the case of a two-camp structure). Before analyzing empirical data, we
aim to introduce a proxy for opinion consistency that does not require such information which is
typically not available for real data. To this end, we introduce opinion stability, S, which measures
the extent to which elements of the opinion vector are the same in independent realizations of the
opinion formation model (see Methods for the definition). If an opinion on a given subject always
ends up positive (or always negative), it is a sign of a robust opinion and it contributes positively to
opinion stability. Small opinion stability indicates that the opinion formation outcomes are highly
volatile and, in turn, they do not comply with the division of subjects in camps in synthetic net-
works. It can be shown that when the relation network’s level of structural balance is one, opinion
stability is one as well.
In synthetic worlds, the opinion stability metric behaves as required when the relation net-
work is sufficiently dense (z & 10): S = 1 in synthetic networks when β = 0 and S is close to
zero when β = 0.5 (see Sec. S4 in the SI). In fact, the values of opinion consistency and opinion
stability are nearly the same for all β values. The main reason for this agreement between stability,
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S, and consistency, C, is that high opinion consistency can be only achieved when the opinions in
question are the same in all model realizations which in turn leads to high opinion stability. Cru-
cially, opinion stability vanishes as the number of subjects grows to infinity similarly as we have
seen it for opinion consistency (see Fig. S9 in the SI).
Equipped with the opinion stability metric, we can assess opinion formation in empirical
worlds represented by empirical signed networks. We first use signed networks derived from
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) votes in individual sessions, where countries that vote
similarly are connected with positive links and countries that vote differently are connected with
negative links (see Methods for the data description). Figure 6a shows part of the network corre-
sponding to the latest completed UNGA session 74 (2019–2020). The loop is unbalanced as the
product of its link weights is −1. As a result, the outcome of opinion formation using the random
neighbor rule is not deterministic: Assuming a positive seed opinion on Italy, the formed opinion
on Russia is negative if it is done using the path ITA-FRA-RUS or positive if it is done using the
path ITA-USA-RUS. This outcome variability manifests itself in Figure 6b,c where two realiza-
tions of the random neighbor rule are shown to considerably differ despite a high level of structural
balance of the respective UNGA network (in this case, B = 0.86). This agrees with our results
in Figure 2b where opinion consistency decreases quickly with β and displays large fluctuations.
Finally, Figures 6d–f show that the majority rule yields substantially more stable opinions and that
the stability difference between the random neighbor rule and the majority rule tends to grow as
the level of structural balance decreases.
The number of nodes in the UNGA datasets is limited by the number of countries partici-
pating in the assembly’s voting (the number of nodes grows from 53 in the 1st assembly to 191
in the 74th). To be able to observe the scaling of opinion stability similar to the scaling of opin-
ion consistency in synthetic data (Fig. 3), we thus use signed trust networks from two popular
online services: Slashdot40, 41 and Epinions41 (see Methods for the data description). Note that
while Slashdot and Epinions are social networks, our model still differs from classical models of
opinion formation on social networks as it concerns opinion formation of an observer, not opinion
formation of each individual member of the social network. Nodes in the given social networks
represent interconnected subjects on which opinions are formed.
We create multiple subsets of each network with progressively increasing numbers of nodes
(see Methods for details). We find that a stability-complexity tension is present also in the real
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worlds (Fig. 7, panels a and b): Opinion stability consistently decreases with the number of sub-
jects (see Fig. S12 in the SI for detailed results showing the mutual effect of the network size
and the level of structural balance). The fitted scaling exponents are 0.40 and 0.19 for Slashdot
and Epinions, respectively (see Fig. S13 in the SI). Note that these values cannot be directly com-
pared with the scaling exponent 2β that we derived for opinion consistency in random networks
as Slashdot and Epinions networks are manifestly non-random. Building on the understanding
that we gained by analyzing simulations on synthetic worlds, we can conclude that the levels of
noise in the two real relation networks are high, which makes opinion formation using the random
neighbor rule unreliable.
We finally study the scaling of the majority rule on real networks (Figure 7c,d). In agreement
with previous results, we observe that the resulting opinion stability is almost always higher than
achieved by the random neighbor rule and the difference generally grows as the network’s level of
structural balance decreases (Fig. S14 in the SI). As N increases, the average opinion stability still
vanishes with N , albeit slower than is the case for the random neighbor rule. The fitted scaling
exponents are 0.09 and 0.05 for Slashdot and Epinions, respectively (Fig. S15 in the SI). Despite
the analyzed real network subsets being rather dense (Fig. S10 in the SI), the opinion stability-
world complexity tension is not averted by the majority rule. We can thus again conclude that the
majority rule alone does not solve the fundamental problem identified by our work: The formed
opinions become progressively less reliable as the system size grows.
Conclusion
We demonstrated that the process whereby an individual sequentially forms opinions on a network
of interrelated subjects is inherently fragile: Even a small amount of noise leads to inherently
fragile (i.e., inconsistent and unstable) outcomes. This suggests that to prevent the spreading of
misinformation in large-scale online systems, it is paramount that there exist no trust links from
credible to low-credibility sources of information. If a tiny fraction of such misleading links exists,
an observer who starts trusting credible information sources may end up trusting a substantial
number of low-credibility sources. If the same happens for a large number of observers, a cluster
of misinformed individuals (such as anti-vaccination clusters7) can thrive.
The more complex our world, the more fragile the process – there is a tension between opin-
ion consistency/stability and the world’s complexity. An individual observer can compensate for
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this increasing fragility by forming an independent (i.e., not derived from the trust network) initial
opinion on a larger number of subjects, before resorting to the trust network to form an opinion
on the remaining subjects. For example, a person forming opinions about a set of interconnected
websites – some of them based on scientific content, some of them promoting conspiracy material
– can increase the opinion consistency/stability by first carefully evaluating the trustworthiness of
a large number of websites, and only then relying on relations between already trusted/distrusted
websites to form opinions on the remaining ones. This suggests that policy to increase the consis-
tency/stability of collective opinions may aim to promote the formation of individuals’ independent
opinion about a substantial number of subjects. Within the studied framework, the majority rule
yields better results, yet: (1) the majority rule is more laborious than the random neighbor rule as
it assumes collecting all direct evidence on each target node, (2) opinion consistency and stability
under the majority rule still vanish when the network is not sufficiently dense and the noise is not
sufficiently low.
From the observer’s standpoint, our work focuses on little cognitively-demanding opinion
formation mechanisms, which opens the way to studying more sophisticated mechanisms, and
understanding the trade-off between the robustness of the resulting opinions and the observer’s
cognitive costs required to form the opinions. In the real world, additional influences—social in-
fluence and mass media, in particular—and heuristics are likely to be at work, and a high level
of heterogeneity across observers is expected. Our framework could be integrated with that intro-
duced in42, for example, to study whether these additional influences further increase or mitigate
the fragility of the individuals’ opinion formation process. More sophisticated opinion formation
models and their calibration on empirical data hold promise to shed light on this process which is
fundamental for our interconnected and information-driven societies.
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Methods
Opinion consistency. When the ground truth division of subjects in camps is known, we compute
the consistency of a given opinion vector o with the ground truth assignment T using Eq. (2). The
seed opinions are excluded from the computation of consistency as these opinions are consistent
by construction. The consistency values range from −1 for the opinion vector that totally disagrees
with the ground truth (for positive seed opinions on subjects from camp 1, for example, the ob-
server has negative opinions on all remaining subjects from camp 1 and positive opinions on all
subjects from camp 2) to +1 for the opinion vector that perfectly matches the ground truth camps
and the seed opinions. The consistency of a random opinion vector is zero on average. Note that
we assume here that opinions have been eventually formed on all subjects, which is the case for all
simulations presented here.
In numerical simulations, we average over independent model realizations on multiple real-
izations of the synthetic two-camp networks to estimate the mean opinion consistency. In Figure 2,
we complement the mean with the 10th–90th percentile range of the consistency values. In Fig-
ure 3, we assess the uncertainty of mean consistency using the standard error of the mean; the
displayed error bars are 3-times of that.
Master equation solution. The proposed opinion formation model using the random neighbor
rule can be studied analytically for the two-camp relation network. We use the number of formed
opinions, n, and the number of “consistent” opinions, c, as the variables to describe the process.
Initially, n = NS and c = NS , because all seed opinions are assumed to be consistent (they are all
positive opinions on subjects from camp 1 or, more generally, positive opinions on subjects from
camp 1 and negative opinions on subjects from camp 2). We introduce the probability distribution
of c consistent opinions after n opinions are formed, P (c;n), with normalization
∑
c P (c;n) = 1.
The initial condition is P (NS;NS) = 1 in line with the description above. To find P (c;n) for
n > 1, we write the general master equation
P (c;n) = P (c− 1;n− 1)W (c− 1 → c;n− 1) + P (c;n− 1)
[
1−W (c → c+ 1;n− 1)
]
. (9)
The transition probability W (c − 1 → c;n − 1) corresponds to forming a consistent opinion in a
situation when n− 1 opinions have been formed, of which c− 1 are correct.
If the target subject (on which the opinion is to be formed) is from camp 1, W (c − 1 →
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c;n − 1) is the probability that the observer decides to form a positive opinion on the target sub-
ject. Assume now that there are t1 trusted (i.e., with a positive opinion) subjects from camp 1, d1
distrusted (i.e., with a negative opinion) subjects from camp 1, t2 trusted subjects from camp 2,
and d2 distrusted subjects from camp 2. The probability of forming a positive opinion on the target
node is nP/(nP + nN) where nP and nN are the numbers of neighbors of the target subject that—
when chosen—would result in forming positive and negative opinions, respectively. The expected
value of nP is proportional to
t1(1− β) + d1β + t2β + d2(1− β) = (c− 1)(1− β) + (n− c)β
where we used that t1+d2 = c−1 and t1+d1+t2+d2 = n−1. Note that it is the random structure
of the relation network that allowed us to write a simple expression. Similarly, nN is proportional
to
t1β + d1(1− β) + t2(1− β) + d2β = (c− 1)β + (n− c)(1− β).
Taken together, these formulas give us the transition probability W (c−1 → c;n−1) = nP/(nP +
nN) = [c(1− 2β) + β(n+ 1)− 1]/(n− 1). The form of W (c− 1 → c;n− 1) is the same when
the target subject is from camp 2. By plugging this W (c− 1 → c;n− 1) in Eq. (9), we obtain the
master equation Eq. (3) which describes how P (c;n) changes as n grows.
Note that the fact that W (c− 1 → c;n− 1) = nP/(nP + nN) implies that the same master
equation—and thus the same opinion formation model—is obtained by a seemingly more thorough
observer who first evaluates all neighbors of the target subject and counts the number of subjects
whose choice would result in forming a positive and a negative opinion, nP and nN , respectively.
Based on nP and nN , the opinion on the target subject can be formed in a probabilistic manner:
Positive with probability nP/(nP + nN) and negative otherwise. The outcome is thus the same as
choosing one neighbor of the target opinion at random and forming the opinion accordingly.
Opinion stability. Opinion consistency assumes that the ground truth division of subjects in
camps is known but that is not the case for most real datasets. To overcome this difficulty, we
introduce another metric to assess the formed opinions, opinion stability. For a given relation net-
work, we fix the opinions on subject i and use R independent model realizations to compute the
average opinion oj for all other subjects. If the formed opinions on subject j are stable, they are
the same in all or most realizations and the value oj is thus close to +1 or −1. By contrast, volatile
formed opinions result in oj close to zero. We then compute the average opinion stability with
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where the absolute value reflects the fact that both oj = 1 and oj = −1 are signs of stable opinions
on subject j. Note that the seed opinion is again excluded from the summation. Opinion stability
is S ′i = 1 when all realizations yield the same opinion on i. For random opinions, however, the
stability is not zero due to the absolute value in Eq. (10) which is never negative. In that case, oj
follows the normal distribution with zero mean and standard deviation 1/
√
R. It can be shown
that the mean of |oj| is
√
2/(Rπ) which represents the expected opinion stability of a random trust









to obtain the final formula for opinion stability. Its values range from zero, on average, when
opinions on all subjects are random to one when opinions on all subjects are the same in all model
realizations. Individual Si values can be used to characterize the stability of opinions based on a
seed opinion on subject i or aggregated to represent the overall opinion stability. In simulations on
synthetic relation networks, we use 1000 independent network realizations and compute opinion
stability for a randomly chosen node. In simulations on real relation networks, we present opinion
stability results for 100 nodes chosen at random. See Fig. S7 in the SI for a direct comparison
between opinion consistency and opinion stability.
Real datasets We test the opinion formation model on three distinct real datasets.
The UNGA dataset is derived from votes by countries at United Nations General Assemblies43.
We use the state ideal point positions in one dimension estimated in44 from the voting data to quan-
tify “state positions toward the US-led liberal order”. The dataset contains all 74 general assemblies
held in the years 1946–2020; assembly 19 is ignored because of faulty data. For each assembly,
estimated state positions xi can be directly translated in distances |xi − xj| between the states. We
generate one signed network for each general assembly by first removing all countries with less
than 20 votes (up to 7 countries have been removed in one session) and then representing state
distances below the 33th percentile (for the given general assembly) as positive links and state
distances above the 67th percentile as negative links, saving the network’s giant component. The
numbers of nodes and links in the network increase progressively from 53 and 919, respectively, in
the 1st general assembly to 191 and 12,096, respectively, in the 74th. The numbers of positive and
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negative links are identical by construction in each network; the level of structural balance ranges
from 0.86 to 0.98.
The Slashdot dataset 45 represents the social network website social network where the users
can tag each other as friends or foes40, 41. While the original network is not symmetric, we represent
it as symmetric, neglecting the mutual links whose signs do not agree (less than 1% of all links)
and finally keeping only the giant component. The resulting Slashdot network comprises 82,052
nodes and 498,527 signed links. The fraction of negative links is 0.236 and the network’s level of
structural balance is B = 0.867.
The Epinions dataset 45 represents the social trust network of the website’s users41. After
the same processing as we apply to the Slashdot data, the resulting Epinions network comprises
119,070 nodes and 701,569 singed links. The fraction of negative links is 0.168 and the network’s
level of structural balance is B = 0.905.
To study the dependence of results on the network size, we created small subsets of the large
Slashdot and Epinions networks by choosing a random node and gradually including its nearest
neighbors, second-nearest neighbors, and so on, until a target number of nodes is reached. We
created 100 independent networks for each network size, each of them starting from a node chosen
at random. An alternative construction by choosing a given number of nodes or links at random
would produce very sparse networks whose sparsity would directly impact the opinion formation
process (see Fig. S8 in the SI). The created subsets, as well as individual UNGA datasets, show
levels of structural balance that are considerably higher than levels of structural balance in their
randomized counterparts (Fig. S11 in the SI). These empirical datasets are thus suitable testbeds
for our opinion formation model. Results obtained on empirical datasets are shown in Figs. 6, 7,
and in Sec. S5 in the SI.
Data availability
The UNGA dataset analysed during the current study is available in the Harvard Dataverse reposi-
tory, https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/LEJUQZ.
The Slashdot dataset analysed during the current study is available in the Stanford Network
Analysis Project repository, http://snap.stanford.edu/data/soc-sign-Slashdot090221.
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html.
The Epinions dataset analysed during the current study is available in the Stanford Network
Analysis Project repository, http://snap.stanford.edu/data/soc-sign-epinions.
html.
Code availability
Source code to simulate opinion formation on synthetic relation networks is available at https:
//github.com/8medom/OpinionFormation.
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Figure 1: The opinion formation model.
(a) An observer faces a set of subjects that are interconnected by mutual relations of trust (solid
green lines) or distrust (dotted red lines). Starting from a small set of seed opinions (here one posi-
tive seed opinion marked with + in a black circle) and a world of unknown subjects (gray circles),
the observer gradually forms opinions on all subjects. (b) The formed opinion is determined as a
product of the opinion on a chosen source subject (one of the seed subjects or any other subject on
which an opinion has been already made) and the sign of the relation between the source subject
and the target subject. A positive opinion is formed when the source opinion and the relation are




























































Figure 2: Opinion formation on random relation networks with a two-camp structure.
(a) Examples of adjacency matrices of regular random networks with a two-camp structure for
100 subjects and various values of node degree, z, and structural noise, β. Subjects 1–50 are
from camp 1 and subjects 51–100 are from camp 2. The green, red, and white points represent
positive, negative, and absent relations, respectively. (b) Resulting opinion consistency for N =
100 subjects, one seed opinion, and various values of z. The lines show mean values and the shaded
regions show the 10th–90th percentile ranges (both computed from 1000 model realizations for
each of 1000 realizations of the relation network). The dotted line labeled ME shows the mean
consistency computed by numerically solving the master equation given by Eq. (3). The dark
dashed line shows the expected consistency if its relationship with the level of noise was linear
[C0(β) = 1 − 2β]. These results demonstrate that consistency decreases quickly with structural
noise. (c) The consistency distributions obtained using Eq. (3) for β = 0.1, one seed subject, and












































Figure 3: Scaling of opinion consistency in synthetic worlds.
Mean opinion consistency, µC , and the standard deviation of consistency, σC , as functions of the
number of subjects, N , for regular random networks with node degree z = 50 and various levels
of structural noise, β. The symbols and error bars show the mean and three times the standard
error of the mean, respectively, obtained by running the model on 1,000 network realizations. The
solid lines show µC(N) and σC(N) obtained by solving the master equation (Eq. (6) and Eq. (S6)
in the SI). (a,b) Results for a single seed opinion. In this scenario, both µC and σC converge to
zero as N grows: There is a tension between opinion consistency and the world’s complexity. (c,d)
Results for a fixed fraction of seed opinions, fS , when the number of seed opinions is NS = fSN ;
here fS = 0.01. In this scenario, the tension between consistency and complexity is prevented: µC
converges to f 2βS (panel c) and σC converges to zero (panel d).
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Figure 4: Opinion consistency for various topologies of synthetic relation networks.
The dependence of mean opinion consistency, µC , on structural noise, β, for one seed opinion
and different numbers of subjects: (a) N = 100 and (b) N = 1, 000. The results are averaged
over 1,000 model realizations on each of 1,000 network realizations, mean degree z ≈ 4 for each
network topology. The error bars are too small to be shown. CN and pr stand for the configuration
model and the rewiring probability in the Watts-Strogatz model, respectively.
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Figure 5: Scaling of opinion consistency achieved by the majority rule in synthetic worlds.
(a,b) The dependencies of µC and σC on the number of subjects, N , are affected by both structural
noise, β, and mean degree, z (the solid, dashed, and dotted lines are used for z equal 50, 10, and 4,
respectively). One seed opinion is used (NS = 1). The symbols and error bars show the mean and
three times the standard error of the mean, respectively, obtained by running the model on 1,000
realizations of regular random networks. (c) The dependence of mean opinion consistency, µC , on
structural noise, β, for a fixed fraction of seed opinions, fS = 0.01, N = 10, 000, and NS = fSN .
The results are averaged over model realizations on 1,000 regular random networks, the error bars
are too small to be shown. The dotted line shows the analytical result µC = f
2β
S for the random












































































Figure 6: Opinion stability for the United Nations General Assembly voting data.
(a) A sample unbalanced subgraph of the last session’s dataset. Links are labeled with absolute
differences between the states’ ideal point positions estimated in44. Absolute differences below the
33th percentile and above the 67th percentile are represented as positive (solid green) and negative
(dotted red) links, respectively. (b,c) Resulting opinions in two different realizations of the random
neighbor rule on the first session’s dataset. Black and white symbols indicate positive and negative
opinions, respectively. The seed opinion (indicated with a larger marker) is the same in both
realizations. (d–f) Opinion stability achieved by the random neighbor rule (d) and the majority
rule (e) plotted against the level of structural balance in input relation networks corresponding to
73 individual UN sessions (symbol color indicates the session year). Panel f shows the difference
between the two rules.
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Figure 7: Scaling of opinion stability in empirical worlds.
Opinion stability achieved in subsets of progressively increasing size by the random neighbor rule
(a,b) and the majority rule (c,d). Subsets have been obtained by sampling from corresponding
empirical signed networks. The boxplots summarize opinion stability values obtained for 100
independent seed opinions (boxes show quartiles of the data and whiskers extend to 1.5 of the
inter-quartile range; outlier data points beyond the whisker range are shown individually). In
parallel with the results on synthetic relation networks, opinion stability decreases with N (opinion
stability-world complexity tension). The decrease is slower for the majority rule than for the
random neighbor rule.
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